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Hoekje: Confession of Judgment

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT UNDER
A WARRANT OF ATTORNEY
HOWARD H. HOEKJE
Portia. Of a strange nature is the suit you follow,
Yet in such rule that the Venetian law
Can not impugn you as you do proceed.You stand within his danger, do you not?
Antonio. Ay, so he says.
Do you confess the bond?
Portia.
Antonio. I do.
-Merchant

T

of Venice, Act. IV, Scene 1

and the bankers of Florence were dominant
factors in the spread of commerce during the early days of the
Renaissance, and the name of the Medici of Florence is synonymous with
a now legendary system in which finance, commerce and politics were
melded. The Italian bankers participated in political and financial activities
throughout the Holy Roman Empire and even into Britain. They are
reported to have brought the first documents of a contractual nature into
Britain about the twelfth century.' The English at that time were having
a problem with the concept of transferring incorporeal property such as
debt, because there was no way of transferring seisin; but they did accept
the proposition that a document evidencing a debt could be transferred.
The idea of representation was still new in the thirteenth century, but was
gaining acceptance because the king could no longer handle all matters
personally. The Italians were developing a law of negotiable paper with a
binding promise in favor of the holder by putting together these elements:
HE MERCHANTS OF VENICE

The cautious Lombard means to have an instrument that will be
available in every court, English or foreign.... Often the debtor is
or to any attorney or
bound to pay the money either to the creditor
2
mandatory of his who shall produce the bond.
The custom spread and Englishmen found themselves promising "to
'3
pay the Florentine or Sienese capitalist."
By this time [13th century] it has spread so far that the debtor who
in express written words promises to pay money either to the creditor

12 F. POLLOCK & F.
2Id.at 223.

MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 222 (2d. ed. 1898).

31d. at 225.
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or to the mandatory [nuntius] or attorney of the creditor is bound by
power to appoint
his promise; he has himself given the creditor
4
a representative for the exaction of the debt.
The outlines of the procedure for confession of judgment under a
warrant of attorney were becoming clearly visible. The practice continued
into eighteenth century England and Blackstone described the procedure
as follows:

It is very unusual, in order to strengthen a creditor's security, for the
debtor to execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by
the creditor, empowering him to confess judgment by either of the
ways just mentioned (by nihil dicit, cognovit actionem, or non sum
in!ormatus) in an action of debt to be brought by the creditor
5
against the debtor for the specific sum due.
The appointment of another to stand in the place of a party to a suit
was a new concept to the common law, for that tradition expected parties
to a suit to appear personally. However, this new concept was confirmed in
later statutes which provided that "attorneys may be made to prosecute or
6
defend any action in the absence of parties to the suit."' The attorney is
to act "with perfect good faith and with a single view to his client's
interest."' 7 Nevertheless, a defendant, to save costs, could confess as
correct matters of law and of fact which were in contention, or give other
instructions to the attorney under which judgment would follow for
the plaintiff.
Where the defendant suffers judgment to go against him by default,
or nihil dicit;... by confession or cognovit actionem, where he
acknowledges the plaintiff's demand to be just: or by non sum
informatus when the defendant's attorney declares he has no
instruction to say anything in answer to the plaintiff.., which is a
8
species of judgment by default.
Not only was this procedure of benefit to the creditor, but the
ingenuity of the debtors led to confessions of judgment which were for
amounts less than due. Thus, safeguards for both debtor and creditor
were instituted so that both parties would know the exact terms of the
confession. Statutory provisions were enacted in the reign of Queen
Victoria under which a "Judge's order given by a trader defendant,
whereby the plaintiff is authorized to sign judgments... must be filed
with the clerk of the docquets in the Queen's Bench within twenty-one

4 Id.at 224.

5 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries,1 397.
6Id. at §26.
7Id. (W. D. Lewis ed. 1900) 1044 n. 16.
8Id. at 9 397.
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days.. ." and an attorney of one of the superior courts was to be present
9
on behalf of the maker and to witness the warrant of attorney.
This practice was adopted in the Colonies and came forward with
other elements of the Common Law heritage when they began existence
as States. But acceptance was not without criticism. In 1824 a judgment
on a bond and warrant of attorney was entered against a supplier of
hides and barks for the face value of the bond. The defendants came
to court to seek relief, claiming demands against the plaintiff. They had
no prior notice because: "The first information he received of the
aforesaid bond being entered up, was when the under-sheriff served the
execution issued in said suit upon him and the other defendants yesterday
afternoon." 10 Chief Justice Kirkpatrick of the New Jersey Supreme Court
Court expressed his opinion of such judgments in this way:
Indeed, I think that these judgments entered upon bonds and warrants
of attorney should, under proper application, be very readily and
widely opened, for the method in which they are entered is the
loosest way of binding a man's property that was ever devised in
any civilized country. 1
One hundred and one years later, a Common Pleas judge in
authorizing
Trumbull County, Ohio, commented, "[A] warrant of attorney
2
confession of judgment [is] looked upon with disfavor."'
Confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney is also known
as a cognovit judgment, and the notes which contain an authorization
for such judgments are known as cognovit notes. The use of the word
cognovit is derived from the phrase cognovit actionem, but the modem
cognovit judgment is distinguishable from the older cognovit actionem,
found in Common Law.
Cognovit actionem leads to a judgment after an action is brought
while a modern-day judgment by confession may be entered without
any action having been brought. Judgment by confession is considered
the confessor submits to the
essentially a voluntary act, by which
3
jurisdiction of the court by consent.'
It has been described more fully as:
[N]ot an ordinary note. It is indeed an extraordinary note which
authorized an attorney to confess judgment against the person or
persons signing it. It is written authority of a debtor and a direction

D. Lewis ed. 1900) 1355 n. 46.
10 Alderman v. Diament, 7 N.J.L. 197, 198 (1824).
11Id. at 198.
9Id.(W.

12 Kinsman Nat]. Bank v. Jerko, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 445, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 300 (C.P.

Trumbull Co. 1925)
13 49

C.J.S. Judgments H 134-37

(1947).
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by him for the entry of a judgment against him if the obligation set
forth in the note is not paid when due. Such a judgment may be
taken by any person or any company holding the note, and it cuts
oil every defense which the maker of the note may otherwise have.
It likewise cuts off all rights of appeal from any judgment taken
14
under it.
This ancient device is still available in Ohio, and is used by lending
agencies engaged in consumer credit transactions. 15 This development may
well have seemed a normal extension of established practices into a minor
part of credit transactions in years past; but today consumer credit plays
a major role in the debt structure of the national economy and deserves
recognition of its qualitative difference from other forms of debt. (As will
be elaborated later in this paper, consumer debt in the United States has
grown 2400% since 1945 and is now half again as great as commercial
and financial debt combined. It is nearly as large as the combined debt
of local and state governments.) Therefore, the use of confession of
judgment under a warrant of attorney as practiced in commercial trading
and other business dealings should not be applied in consumer credit
transactions. The most direct means for effecting this is by statutory
exclusion of consumer credit transactions from the provisions of the
confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney procedure.
Strict construction has been applied to such warrants of attorney and
the judgments are to be vacated when the confessor shows credible
evidence of a valid defense. 16 Among the reasons for which such
judgments have been vacated include:
17
(1) the actual warrant of attorney was not produced;
(2) the amount due was not specifically stated or ascertainable; 18
(3) the place of payment was not specified, and the designation of
any attorney of any court was too vague; 19

14Jones v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 930, 935 (W.D. Mich.

1968).
15Capital Finance Corp. v. Cillani, 19 Ohio App.2d 181, 250 N.E.2d 626 (Ct. App.
Hamilton County 1969); Beneficial Finance Co. v. Smith, 150 Ohio App.2d 208, 240
N.E.2d 106 (Ct. App. Hamilton County 1968); Public Finance Corp. v. Barnes, 83
Ohio L. Abs. 458, 165 N.E.2d 696 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1960).
16 Livingstone v. Rebman, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 349, 147 N.E.2d 668 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1958), rev'd, 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959).
17Lathrem v. Foreman, 2 Ohio Op.2d 130, 140 N.E.2d 570 (C.P. Montgomery
County), rev'd, 145 N.E.2d 555 (Ct. App. Montgomery County 1957), rev'd, 168
Ohio St. 186, 151 N.E.2d 905 (1958).
18Hill v. Buchanan, 21 Ohio Op. 24, 6 Ohio Supp. 230 (C.P. Mercer County 1941).
29 Rosen v. Albert, 12 Ohio Op.2d 448, 165 N.E.2d 844 (C.P. Summit County 1960).
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(4) the statute of limitations operates even though the confession
20
releases all rights of appeal;
21
(5) the life of the warrant is limited to one use;
(6) the wording on a warrant made out in another state did not
22
conform to Ohio wording;
(7)

fraud;2 3

(8)

forgery.

24

The procedure for opening up confessed judgments in Ohio has
been considered not to be an undue burden on the debtor and to present
only a minimal obstacle,21 and the availability of the cognovit provision
26
itself has been considered useful.
Professor Hunter of Ohio State University surveyed five hundred
cognovit judgments entered in Franklin County, Ohio, during the period
1937-39. These judgments represented 14.3% of the 3510 civil cases
entered in the period covered. In only 26 of the 500 cases was any attempt
made to set aside the judgment, and of those 26, only two went to
the defendant on trial. Professor Hunter concluded that the cognovit
judgment is a useful device because so few (0.4%) of them were turned
27
into verdicts for the defendant.
Even though there may not have been widespread abuse of cognovit
judgments, the danger of abuse is always present and the probability
of misuse or abuse occurring increases as the number of such notes
increases. For example, a job has been lost because of judgments which
2

OFirst Natl. Bank v. Spies, 158 Ohio St. 499, 110 N.E.2d 483, 35 A.L.R.2d

1446 (1953).
2'Public Fin. Corp. v. Barnes, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 458, 165 N.E.2d 696 (Ct. App.

Cuyahoga County 1960).
2
2Kinsman Natl. Bank v. Jerko, 25 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 445, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 300 (C.P.
Trumbull County 1925).
2

3Columbia Discount & Loan Co v. Burton, 155 N.E.2d 708 (Ct. App. Franklin

County, Ohio 1958).
24

Livingstone v. Rebman, 77 Ohio L. Abs. 349, 147 N.E.2d 668 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga
County 1958).
25 D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184 (1972).
26 Hunter, The Warrant of Attorney to Confess Judgment, 8 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1941-42).
27 Id. A possible inference which could be drawn from these data is that cognovit
judgments are 99.6% right-or even purer than Ivory Soap. Another interpretation of
the same data is that only 5.2% of those against whom the holder of a cognovit note
takes action are knowledgeable enough, rich enough or motivated enough to seek
redress. A further consideration in interpreting the data is that the economic and
financial conditions of the early and mid-thirties were so different from those of the
sixties and seventies as to be virtually incomprehensible to those who were not part of
them. Although this paper does not agree with Professor Hunter's conclusion at least

as far as current conditions are concerned, he does deserve recognition for having
made some concrete attempt to measure the impact of the procedure, and is not
questioned.
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were entered erroneously, resulting in garnishments.28 In another case, two
judgments were entered on the same note.29 Furthermore, the number of
cases cited previously, in which the defenses were eventually judged
valid, 30 show that the entry of a cognovit judgment is not always faultless
and in the support of justice.
The position of the debtor is clearly stated in the Ohio statute
authorizing cognovit notes.
[A] court judgment may be taken against you without your prior
knowledge and the powers of the court can be used to collect from
you or your employer regardless of any claims you may have against
on his
the creditor whether for returned goods, faulty goods, failure
3
part to comply with the agreement, or any other cause. '
With an entry of judgment under this statute, the creditor no longer
has the burden of proving his claim; rather the burden is on the
consumer-debtor to prove his defense, and he is usually ill-equipped
to bear that burden with its additional court costs, attorney's fees, and
associated personal expenses.
The vulnerability of the debtor in this situation offends our traditional
sense of justice and fair play, and raises the question of whether the
minimum requirements of due process for notice and an opportunity
to be heard are not denied.
The constitutionality of cognovit notes was questioned by Professor
Hopson of Kansas University about a decade ago. 32 He traced the
developments in personal jurisdiction from the decision in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington 33 and noted that the trend was to protect the right
of the plaintiff to sue in his own state. Hopson raised the question of corresponding protection for the defendant's liability in a suit away from home,
as in the case of a cognovit judgment. The conclusion was that under the
notice and opportunity to be heard requirements for due process, cognovit
judgments probably were unconstitutional, but some court tests were needed.
28 Harp v. Administrator, B.U.C., 12 Ohio Misc. 34, 230 N.E.2d 376 (C.P. Hamilton

County 1967). The employer had a rule under which an employee whose wages were
garnished twice in one year was subject to discharge. This action was an appeal from
a ruling of the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation denying unemployment
compensation. The appeal was upheld.
29 Public Finance Corp. v. Barnes, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 458, 165 N.E.2d 696, 80 A.L.R.2d
1376 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1960). Judgment had been rendered on a note in
Cleveland, and later the holder of the note had judgment entered in Lakewood. The

Municipal Court of Lakewood dismissed the debtor's petition to vacate, but the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed.
30 Supra nn. 17-24.
31 Omo REV. CODE § 2323.13 (D)

(Supp. 1971).

32 Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith

and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1961-62).
- 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Since Hopson wrote his article, the Supreme Court of the United
34
Bay View
States heard the case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of
and held that garnishment before a judgment has been obtained, without
notice and a prior hearing, violates the fundamental principles of due
process. The analogy to judgment by confession under a warrant of
attorney is close. In both cases property is taken from its holder at the
instigation of a stranger, usually the creditor's lawyer, until the debtor can
convince the court to hear his defense. While formally the word judgment
is used in the confession procedure, practically, the effects are the same.
At the same time the Supreme Court was hearing Sniadach, the Court
of Appeals of New York heard a case involving a cognovit judgment
35
entered in Pennsylvania. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine came up for a
hearing on appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division, which
reversed the lower court ruling denying a motion for summary judgment.
New York residents had signed a cognovit note in Pennsylvania. The holder of the note obtained a judgment on the note in a Pennsylvania Court,
New York to seek judgment under the full faith and credit clause to make
up the deficiency. The New York court concluded that the judgment
rendered in Pennsylvania would not be honored by New York because:
(1) the Pennsylvania procedure, requiring only entry by a prothonotary was not a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the full faith
and credit clause; and
(2) a warrant of attorney which permits entry of judgment anywhere
in the world without notice violates due process and the court rendering
the judgment does not have jurisdiction.
A spate of generally favorable commentaries followed the publication
of this decision, supporting the proposition that due process elements
36
are not present in cognovit notes. What criticism there was was directed
more to the process by which the conclusion was reached than to the
conclusion itself.
The United States Supreme Court has recently heard two cases on
point, one from Pennsylvania and one from Ohio. The Supreme Court
came to the conclusion that cognovit provisions are not unconstitutional

34 395 U.S. 337 (1969).

N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
36 Comment, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 COL. L.
REv. 1118 (1970); Comment, The Effect of Full Faith and Credit on Cognovit
Judgments, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 173 (1970); Leonard, Confessions of Judgment: The
Due Process Defects, 43 TEMPLE L.Q. 279 (1970); Comment, Cognovit Judgments
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 50 BOSTON U.L. REv. 330 (1970); Goodman,
Enforcement of Sister State's Cognovit Judgments, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1181 (1970);
Agler, Confession of Judgments-Refusal of New York State to Enforce Pennsylvania
Cognovit Judgments, 74 DIcK. L. REv. 750 (1970).
3525
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per se, but under some circumstances might be. Thus, the circumstances
under which the debtor commits himself to the power of the creditor
are decisive.
The Pennsylvania case was Swarb v. Lennox.37 This was a class
action attacking the Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure.
The procedure is:
Judgment by confession may be entered by the prothonotary...
without the agency of an attorney and without the fling of a
complaint, declaration or confession for the amount which may
38
appear to be up from the face of the instrument.
A three-judge District Court heard the case. The District Court noted
that the system leading to confessed judgment and execution complies with
due process requirements only if "there has been an understanding and
39
voluntary consent of the debtor in signing the document.
Because the rights of notice and opportunity to be heard could be
waived if the waiver was understandingly and voluntarily made, the court
examined the question of whether or not the plaintiffs understood what
they were signing and, if so, whether they had signed voluntarily. The
testimony of the plaintiffs, whose educational level was generally low,
made it quite clear to the court that they had been uninformed as to the
presence of the cognovit provisions, and would have had difficulty
understanding it if they had been aware of it. A study of debtors in
Pennsylvania against whom judgments had been entered was relied on to
help define the class. 40 This study showed that only 4% of those debtors
had incomes over $10,000 per year, and therefore the District Court
distinguished the class as natural persons living in Pennsylvania with
annual incomes under $10,000 who had signed consumer financing or
lease contracts containing cognovit provisions. Those signing home
mortgages were excluded because of special procedures included in the act
of signing the mortgage papers which were designed to make the signers
aware of the contents of the documents. One of the three judges dissented
to the limitation on income, and would expand the class to those making
over $10,000 annually."' The practice was found unconstitutional as
applied to the designated class, and appeal was taken claiming error in
thus limiting relief. The Supreme Court affirmed the limitation stating that:
"[U]nder appropriate circumstances a cognovit debtor may be held

F. Supp. 1091; aff'd 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
SPA. R. Civ. P. 2951.

37314
3

39

4

314 F. Supp. at 1095.

oSee 314 F. Supp. at 1097.

41314 F. Supp. at 1102.
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if the
effectively and legally to have waived the rights he would possess
42
provision.
cognovit
no
contained
had
signed
he
document
The "appropriate circumstances" referred to were present in the
Ohio case, which concerned corporate rather than consumer financing. In
D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.43 the parties bargained at arm's length
before a cognovit clause was included in a reformed contract.
D. H. Overmyer Company was part of a warehousing enterprise
which operated in 30 states under several corporate identities. Frick
Company installed refrigeration equipment in a warehouse for Overmyer
in Toledo, Ohio, under a contract. Overmyer fell behind in payments
and, after some negotiations, a new agreement was reached. But once
more Overmyer needed an extension of time, and a new agreement was
reached on terms for a new note which would contain a confession of
judgment clause. Overmyer obtained some benefits, such as extension of
payments over 21 months instead of 12, and interest at 6% instead
of 6 %. Frick obtained the cognovit clause and second mortgages on
property in Florida and Kentucky. Yet, again, Overmyer interrupted
payments on its obligations and, almost 15 months after the work done
by Frick had been accepted, Overmyer instituted an action for breach of
contract in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Shortly thereafter Frick obtained judgment against
Overmyer in Ohio. Overmyer sought to stay execution and obtain a new
trial in Ohio, but was denied by the Common Pleas Court, affirmed by
the Court of Appeals of Lucas County, and eventually the Supreme Court
of Ohio. The appeals to both Ohio courts were based on violation of
due process under both the Ohio and Federal constitutions, but neither
44
court found any substantial constitutional issue.
The appeal to the United States Supreme Court was based on
(1) lack of personal jurisdiction in the Ohio courts because there was
no personal service, no voluntary appearance and the attorney did not
truly represent Overmyer, and, (2) lack of due process because there
was no notice or opportunity to be heard.
Both arguments were rejected by the Supreme Court because "[t]he
due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are
subject to waiver." ' 45 The requirements for the waiver to be effective
are that it be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. In Overmyer,
Overmyer was represented by counsel, negotiations covered an extended

42 405 U.S. at 200.
43 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
44 Id. The Court of Appeals of Lucas County made only a journal entry, and the Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed sua sponte.
45 Id. at 185.
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time and the cognovit provision was agreed to in exchange for benefits
received. In this situation the United States Supreme Court found no
violation of constitutional due process.
We therefore hold that Overmyer, in its execution and delivery to
Frick of the second installment note containing the cognovit
provision, voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly waived the rights
it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing,
and that
46
it did so with full awareness of the legal consequences.
The distinction between the facts of Overmyer and those of Swarb
are quite striking. It is easy to agree with the Supreme Court that
Overmyer had the benefit of "due process." There may well be other
situations in which the availability of cognovit clauses may be of benefit
to either or both parties and entered into "knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily." For example, in Jones v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. 47 a cognovit note was used for the payment of an insurance premium
which provided coverage during the early stages of processing and no
outright cash payment was required. Such situations, however, are not
those encountered in consumer transactions involving credit in retail sales,
or so-called small loans. In virtually all such situations the debtor-to-be
does not truly bargain with the creditor-to-be. Contracts are almost
invariably pre-printed with only a few blanks to be filled in with the
date, the names and the amounts. Obiter dictum in the Supreme Court's
opinion strongly suggests that their holding in Overmyer would not apply
to such consumer credit transactions.
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts
of other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where
the debtor receives nothing
for the cognovit provision, other legal
48
consequences may ensue.
Thus, the position of the United States Supreme Court seems to
be that while cognovit provisions are not unconstitutional per se, for
a certain class of Pennsylvania residents they are, and for other persons
may be. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to define what would be constitutional. The District Court
used these words: "It is not our function to dictate to a state exactly what
constitutes understanding waiver of notice in each particular case and what
proof of such notice would comply with the above mentioned decisions." 49

46 Id. at 187.
47 289 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
48 405 U.S. at 188.

49 314 F. Supp. at 1100.
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The Supreme Court, in confirming this position, stated: "Problems of
'
this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist for the legislative mill."
The Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County in Ohio, in accord with
the Supreme Court's approach, has looked to legislation for direction. In
51
Union Savings Assn. v. Home Owners Aid the defendants were seeking
who confesses judgment in a
attorney
"An
a construction of the wording:
case, at the time of making such confession, must produce the warrant
which would require the
of attorney for making it to the court ....,,52
physical act of confessing in court. The Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County held that the physical presence of the confessing attorney was
not required, and that the plaintiff's attorney could serve as agent for
the confessing attorney. The Court said: "The very existence of Section
2323.13 shows the Legislature's acceptance of the institution of the
cognovit note and, we must assume, the legislative intention that it have
a viable existence," 53 and:
To read the statute as requiring the physical presence of an attorney
to confess the judgment, who literally and actually represented the
defendant, would necessarily destroy the cognovit concept.... The
usefulness of the statute could not survive a mandatory adversary
procedure that was more than formal.M
Thus legislative action appears to be the route to follow to effect
a revision in cognovit procedures.
The Ohio statute authorizing confession of judgment under a warrant
of attorney is unusual among the states. It contains four paragraphs,
directed toward:
(1) production of the warrant and limitation of venue to the county
where the maker resides;
(2) statement of the residence of the maker;
(3) provision for notification to the defendant of entry of the
judgment; and
(4) warning in a conspicuous place and type that rights to notice
and court trial are lost and any claims against the creditor will not
be available in defense.55
It had been proposed some years ago that cognovit notes were useful
tools for the modern businessman and were an aid to congested courts.
50 405 U.S. at 202.
51 18 Ohio App.2d 63, 246 N.E.2d 908 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, 1969).
52 OHIO REv. CODE § 2323.13(A) (Supp. 1971).
53 18 Ohio App.2d at 64, 246 N.E.2d at 909.
54 Id. at 65, 264 N.E.2d at 909. See supra at 3, and nn. 5-8. The Common Law did
require the confessing attorney to literally and actually represent the defendant.
55 Omo REV. CODE § 2323.13 (Supp. 1971). See Appendix A for complete statute.
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Therefore, they should be controlled rather than abolished, and giving
the debtor an opportunity to know and understand what he has signed
would be consistent with the business ethic expressed in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 56 This business ethic is expressed as "obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care," 57 and since it would
be a breach of good faith to enforce the cognovit provision without
notice, making the debtor aware of what he is signing, and giving notice
before the judgment becomes absolute (10 days' delay was suggested)
should answer all objections, according to this proposal.
These considerations may well be on point in dealings between
merchants but they miss the mark in dealings between individual
consumers and business organizations. Even "a lawyer or bank president
buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant. '5 8 The presence
of the warning in big type, just above the signature may well eliminate
the element of surprise which is part of the unconscionability consideration
by which courts may render contracts void. 59 It does seem to provide
the requirement of knowledge for waiver of constitutional rights, but it
does not necessarily make agreement to the provisions of the contract
voluntary. The victims of the pirates who walked the plank may well have
done so knowingly and understandingly (and this may well have constituted a large part of the pleasure the pirates derived from the exercise)
but only in the very limited sense of choosing between two evils could
it be called voluntary. In the same way, there is no real alternative
for the consumer, with or without knowledge of his fate. He either agrees
to the cognovit clause, or he goes without. Such a warning does not
satisfy the requirements of "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily"
agreeing. It satisfies only the requirement of "knowingly."
The use of a confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney
developed as a result of business relations between merchants. 60 Merchants
are expected to be knowledgeable and skilled in commercial relations.
They have traditionally been known to drive a hard bargain and to
conduct their business in keeping with the traditions of commerce.
Consumers, on the other hand, do not generally have the knowledge,

56 Note, A Clash in Ohio?; Cognovit Notes and the Business Ethic of the UCC, 35
U. CINN. L.R. 470 (1966).
57 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3).
58 Id. § 2-104, Comment 2. The UCC seems to recognize the differences between
consumer transactions and other commercial transactions because in Sec. 2-102 it
distinguishes "sales to consumers," and Sec. 9-102 recognizes consumer transactions
as distinct from other commercial transactions.
59 Id. § 2-303.
6OSee supra at n. 1-4, and especially n. 2&3, together with reference to the trader
defendant in n.9, showing the overriding, if not exclusive, association with trade and
pmmerce.
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means or motivation to conduct their business in the same way. In earlier
times it may well have been a common practice for housewives to bargain
at the market with sellers of produce, for horse traders to strike a sharp
bargain and for the peddler to vary his price to match his expectation of
the willingness of the customer to pay. But these transactions were
essentially between individuals whereas today consumer transactions are
overwhelmingly between units of large commercial organizations and
individuals. Bargaining over the price and terms of sale between buyers
and sellers in today's retail establishments is unheard of, except for
automobile purchases. Indeed, the clerks who consummate the sales are
without authority to change the listed price. The American buying public
1
has accepted the principle of single pricing in retail trade, and generally
conduct their business as if they had no alternative to accepting the terms
of the retail establishment except total rejection. Partly to make acceptance
of the conditions more amenable, and partly to expand the volume of their
business, retail trade extended more and more liberal terms to their credit
customers. Money-lending activities paralleled the growth of retail trade,
so that over the past twenty-five years the growth in consumer debt has
far outstripped the growth in any other form of debt. For example, while
the Federal debt has increased 20% since 1945, commercial and financial
debt has increased 400%, corporate debt 800%, state and local government debt 1000%, and consumer debt increased 2400% .62 The fraction of
total net public and private debt represented by consumer debt has
increased from 1.25% in 1945 to 7% in 1970, and now is nearly as large
6
as the entire combined debt of all local and state governments. 3 No longer
is consumer debt but one-third as large as commercial and financial debt
as it was in 1945; it is now more than one and a half times as great as the
combined commercial and financial debt. As pointed out earlier it is no
longer an insignificant part of the total debt structure, but is now the single
largest item in individual and noncorporate debt except for mortgages. It
deserves recognition as qualitatively different from other types of debt, and
any change in statutory treatment should recognize this difference.
There are a wide variety of ways in which the states handle
confessions of judgment under a warrant of attorney. In general, the
approaches are: (I) to limit the use of confession of judgment and
warrant of attorney to timely use, as at trial, or to require recording
of the warrant as for property, and, (2) to specifically prohibit such
clauses in installment contracts and small loans.
61 The Fair Trade pricing of a generation ago expressed almost a national policy in
support of single pricing in retail trade; and there was substantial support of the
principle.
62 Economic Report of the President, 26, Table B-62 (1972). Total consumer debt in

1970 is listed as $126.8 billion and state and local government debt as $143.3 billion.
63 Iad.
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Hopson described the position of 49 states on the confession of
judgment under a warrant of attorney. 64 The movement in the decade
since has been toward still more stringent restrictions on the use of the
cognovit clause. A summary comparison of the positions of the states in
1962 as given by Hopson, and in 1971, is shown in the tabulation below.
Number of States with
Statutes Indicated
Change in
In 1962 In 1971
Number
No statutes ......
...................
4
165
-3
General statutes allow ....
..............
7
66
-1
Limitations on use of warrants of attorney . . . 23
967
- 14
Prohibit cognovit notes in retail credit .......
13
29 6
+16
Prohibit cognovit notes and
provide penalties for inclusion .........
2
569
+3
During the intervening decade, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
was introduced and adopted by five states.70 Ohio revised its statutes
twice, in 1967 and 1970, before arriving at its present form.' A bill is
currently under consideration by the Ohio Legislature which would make
cognovit notes invalid. The bill is identified as Sub. H.B. 350. It has

64 See Hopson, supra, n. 32.
65 Kansas; a prohibition was repealed in 1969.
66 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3908 (1953); HAWAII REV. LAWS tit. 34, § 633-3 (1968);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (1968); OHIO REV. CODE § 2313.13 (Supp. 1971); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1972); S.D. COMp. LAWS § 21-26-1 (1967).
67
ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); ALAS. STAT. § 22.20.040-070 (1971); AnK. STAT.
ANN. § 29-301 (1962); WEST CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 8 1132, 1133 (West 1972); GA.
CODE ANN. § 110-601 (1959); Mo. REV. STAT. 88 511.070-080 (1952); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 25-201 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. 8 8-355, 8-356, 8-359 (Supp. 1972); W.VA.
CODE ANN. § 56-4-48 (1966).
6
8ARmz. REv. STAT. ANN. H8 6-629, 44-143 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6
(1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. 8 42-88, 36-326 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. §8
55.05, 516.16 (1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 536.12 (Supp. 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 288.580, 372.140 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. § 6:585 (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 3084 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 11 § 198 (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 255 B § 20 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 8H 493.12, 445.864 (Supp.
1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.12, 168.71 (Supp. 1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5591-14
(Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 47-213, 13-811 (1967); NEn. REV. STAT. 98
8-447, 8-823 (1970); NEV. REv. STAT. 8 675.350 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. H8
399-A:5, 361-A:7 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 2A:16-9, 361-A:7 (1952); N.Y. BANK.
LAW H8 353, 570 (McKinney 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. 8 53-181, 25A-18 (1965);
N.D. CODE § 13-03-15-2 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-415 (Supp. 1972);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-800.13 (Supp. 1971); TEx. Civ. STAT. arts. 5069-3.20, 5069-6.05
(1971); UTAH CODE ANN. H870B 3-407, 70B 2-415 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
1 2456 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 31.08.150 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 214.4
(Supp. 1972); Wyo. STAT. 8 40-2-415, 40-3-407 (Supp. 1971).
69
1DAHO CODE 88 28:32-415, 28:33-407, 28:35-202 (Supp. 1971); IND. STAT. ANN.
8 19-22-415, 2-2906 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. 88 21-9-16, 50-16-5 (1970); ORE. REV.
STAT. 8 725.050, 725.990 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS H8 19-25-24, 19-25-36 (1968).
70 Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
71Omo REV. CODE 8 2323.13 (Supp. 1971).
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passed the House and the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of this
writing, and is in the Rules Committee of the Senate awaiting assignment
72
for a floor vote. This bill provides for changes in the statutes covering
73
It does provide
secured transactions and retail installment sales.
protection to a retail installment debtor with respect to his rights against
a holder in due course, replevin of collateral and opportunity to cure
default, and would make a cognovit provision in an instrument issued in
connection with a retail installment contract invalid, if it results from a
consumer transaction. This bill is the culmination of substantial effort on
their
the part of a Joint Committee of the General Assembly and presents
74
protection.
consumer
of
study
a
from
resulting
recommendations
A major obstacle to its passage is reported to be the objection of the
Ohio Bankers Association to the changes in the "holder in due course"
doctrine and the invalidation of cognovit notes. This objection is based
largely on the fable that retail trade will suffer because a sharp decline in
commercial lending will follow. It seems downright ridiculous to argue
seriously that trade and commerce will decline if provisions such as are in
effect in New York, Michigan and Texas are enacted. The securities
markets in New York, the petroleum industry in Texas and the automobile
industry in Michigan are major economic factors not only within their
own states, but in the nation as well. Retail activity at Macy's and Gimbel's
in New York, and along Livernois Avenue in Detroit is high by any
standard. Whatever statutory position is taken in relation to consumer
loans secured by cognovit notes really has no major impact on the
development of industrial and commercial bases of economic strength. As
for the financial institutions which do cater to retail credit and small loan
business, many of them already operate with some enthusiasm in
states without cognovit provisions. BankAmericard, Master-Charge, the
petroleum companies and air travel companies handle consumer credit
transactions throughout the country. If cognovit provisions were really
important to their operations, it would seem that they would be reluctant
to extend credit where such provisions were not available. Yet, Hopson
surveyed a large number of lending institutions which were active in states
where cognovit notes were not available to them as well as in Ohio, and
found that most of them, by their own admission, did operate satisfactorily
75
in states without cognovit provisions. The reason such clauses were
included in contracts written in Ohio were: (1) custom, and (2)
72Letter from Frank H. Mayfield, Jr., to Howard H. Hoekje, July 19, 1972. See
Appendix B.
73 The Bill under consideration by the Senate contains some amendments not present
in the original House Bill. It is section 1317.15, not in the original House Bill, which
would invalidate cognovit notes arising from a consumer transaction.
74 Akron Beacon-journal, June 25, 1972 at A20, col. 1.
75 Hopson, supra, n. 32.
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competitive requirements. As long as the law allows the use of cognovit
notes, any business which could use them probably would; and if one
party uses them, it would be considered almost stupid in the business
community if others did not.
The absence of cognovit notes would place no serious impediment in
the way of lending activities. In practice, however, if cognovit notes were
invalid, and all lenders operated under the same rules, the major change
in modus operandi would probably be a restriction in availability of credit
to marginal risks. This is probably desirable on balance, because many
applicants for consumer credit depend on the judgment of the creditor
for an assessment of their ability to carry the loan.
Two alternatives to prohibition of cognovit notes which should be
considered, at least briefly, are:
(1) restrictions on the use of warrants of attorney; and
(2) consideration for inclusion of cognovit clauses in contracts.
Twenty-seven states limit the use of confession of judgment in some
way, as for example, to situations in which action has been instituted, or
where the defendant verifies the amount due by oath. 76 This use is in line
with the historical use of cognovit actionem. A modification requires a
timely affidavit by the debtor describing the debt. For example, Missouri
authorizes confession of judgment without action 77 but requires the
defendant to make a statement in writing, verified by oath, stating the sum
due and the facts to support the position that the sum is justly due. 78 The
plaintiff can also confess judgment under a warrant of attorney if the
warrant is acknowledged as required for deeds of land, and there is
an affidavit by the plaintiff stating the debt is "bona fide for a fair
79
and valuable consideration."
These restrictions are appealing on their face, because they seem to
require the voluntary participation in confession necessary to meet the test
of constitutionality. These procedures would require the normal actions of
7

6ALL CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-143 (1956); ALASKA
STAT. 1 22.20.40 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 29-301 (1962); WEST. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 1133 (West 1954); FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. §

110-601 (1959); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 10-902; IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-2903 and 2904
(1946); IOWA CODE ANN. § 676:3 (1962); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 372.140 (1962);
MIcro COMp. LAWS § 600.2906 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.23 (1961); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1545 (1942); Mo. R. Civ. P. § 74.25 (1956); NEB. REV. STAT. §
25.906-7 (1956); NEv. REV. STAT. § 17.100 (1963); N.J. REv. STAT. 42A:16-9 (1956);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-9 (1963); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. R. § 3201 (McKinney 1970);
OaE. REV. STAT. § 26.120 (1961); S.D. COMP. LAW § 21-26-21 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 25-201 (1956); TEX. R. Civ. P. § 314 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-355 (1957);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. H§ 460.040-050 (1962); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 56-4-48 (1966).

77Mo. R. Civ. P. 74.24.
78 Id. Rule 74.25.
79 Id. Rule 74.27.
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debt or replevin to be instituted, or at least a more serious treatment
of the warrant to be used. In practice, however, the added costs of the
procedure would surely be added to the cost of the loan, and the ingenuity
and superior knowledge the creditor could bring to bear would leave the
debtor still the victim of unequal power.
The exchange of consideration for a confession of judgment clause
has some appeal. It would probably satisfy the requirement of voluntarily
waiving rights; but the amount of consideration which would be acceptable
would probably have to be set by statute lest the creditor so dominate the
trading that unequal bargaining power destroys the constitutionality. For
example, a 33% reduction in interest rate in exchange for a cognovit
clause might be attractive to the debtor. It is likely, however, that the
creditor would rather take his chances with the full interest rate, which
would support the thesis that the cognovit clause has no real impact on
whether or not consumer loans would be made.
A satisfactory approach seems to be that taken by New York. In the
first place commercial or business use of any plan of deferred payments
payable in two or more installments is distinguished from consumer
use.80 Furthermore, the attorney appearing under the power of attorney is
charged with appearing, representing and acting for the principal."
Finally, the inclusion of cognovit clauses in retail installment and small
82
loan contracts is prohibited. This treatment is desirable because:
(1) a power, or warrant of attorney is used as it was originally
intended to be used and the legal process retains its traditional adversary
quality;
(2) consumer transactions are distinguished from business and
commercial transactions; and
(3) cognovit clauses are prohibited in consumer transactions, but
not commercial transactions, without ambiguity.
The legislation proposed for Ohio reads:
A warrant of attorney to confess judgment contained in any
instrument issued in connection with a retail contract arising from
a consumer transaction, executed on or after the effective date of
this section, is invalid and the courts are without jurisdiction to
83
render a judgment based upon such a warrant.
"Consumer transaction" is defined to include sale or lease of goods
4
or intangibles, but does not include money.8 It appears to be effective
80 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. R. § 3201 (McKinney 1970).
81 N.Y. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS § 5-1502H (McKinney 1964).
82 N.Y. BANK. LAW 570, 353 (McKinney 1971).
83 Sub. H.B. No. 350, 109th Gen. Ass. (1971-72) 1 1317.15.
84ld.

11309.47(P).
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for the transactions covered, but a comparable section should be enacted
to cover so-called small loans. It would be desirable for Ohio to adopt
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as it has adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code; but recognizing the long history of use of cognovit
notes in Ohio, the enactment of the proposed legislation would not be
inconsequential. The proposed legislation should be enacted because:
(1) unrestricted confessions of judgment under a warrant of
attorney give too much power to the holder;
(2) agreement to such provisions must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily;
(3) retail installment and small loan contracts are almost invariably
contracts of adhesion and agreement is only nominally voluntary;
(4) reliance on restrictions on the use of warrants of attorney
generally would not differ significantly from existing practice;
(5) the exchange of consideration for inclusion of cognovit clauses
would probably be constitutional, but the interpretation of adequate
consideration leaves substantial ambiguity;
(6) the nature of consumer transactions is qualitatively different
from commercial and business loans, and they should be treated differently;
(7) elimination of cognovit clauses is expected to have only minimal
effects on trade and commerce; and
(8) confession of judgment under a warrant of attorney has been
prohibited in a great majority of states, and the trend is toward stricter
restrictions in line with a general policy to distribute the risks of
retail trade more evenly between individual consumers and business
organizations as has been done with product liability.
HowARuD HOEKJE

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss1/4

18

Hoekje: Confession of Judgment

Winter, 19731

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT

APPENDIX A
Ohio's Statute Governing Warrant of Attorney to Confess
Ohio Revised Code, Section 2323.13 (Supp. 1971 )
(A) An attorney who confesses judgment in a case, at the time of
making such confession, must produce the warrant of attorney for making
it to the court before which he makes the confession. Notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary, if the maker or any of several makers
resides within the territorialjurisdiction of a municipal court established
under section 1901.01 of the Revised Code, or signed the warrant of
attorney authorizing confession of judgment in such territory, judgment
on such warrant of attorney shall be confessed in the municipal court
having jurisdiction in such territory, provided the court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter; otherwise, judgment may be confessed in any
court in the county where the maker or any of several makers resides or
signed the warrant of attorney. The original or a copy of the warrant
shall be filed with the clerk.
(B) The attorney who represents the judgment creditor shall include
in the petition a statement setting forth to the best of his knowledge the
last known address of the defendant.
(C) Immediately upon entering any such judgment the court shall
notify the defendant of the entry of the judgment by personal service
or by registered or certified letter mailed to him at the address set forth
in the petition.
(D) A warrant of attorney to confess judgment contained in any
promissory note, bond, security agreement, lease, contract, or other
evidence of indebtedness executed on or after January 1, 1971, is invalid
and the courts are without authority to render a judgment based upon
such a warrant unless there appears on the instrument evidencing the
indebtedness, directly above or below the signature of each maker, or
other person authorizing the confession, in such type size or distinctive
marking that it appears more clearly and conspicuously than anything
else on the document:
"Warning-By signing this paper you give up your right to notice
and court trial. If you do not pay on time a court judgment may be taken
against you without your prior knowledge and the powers of a court can
be used to collect from you or your employer regardless of any claims
you may have against the creditor whether for returned goods, faulty
goods, failure on his part to comply with the agreement, or any other
cause."
HIsTORY: 128 v. 137 (Eff. 9/14/59); 132 v. H614 (Eff. 12/1/67);
133 v. S85 (Eff. 9/16/70).
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APPENDIX B
OHIO HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES

Columbus 43215
FRANK H. MAYFIELD, JR.
280 Central Trust Bldg.
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
67TH HOUSE DISTRICT
Hamilton County

COMMITTEES:
CONSUMER PROBLEMS
& PROTECTION, Chairman
INSURANCE, PUBLIC UTILITIES
& FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
Vice Chairman
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT & URBAN
AFFAIRS

July 19, 1972
Mr. Howard H. Hoekje
883 Ghent Ridge Drive
Akron, Ohio 44313
Dear Mr. Hoekje:
Pursuant to your inquiry of July 15 on the cognovit note legislation,
be advised that the bill can be identified as H.B. 350, which has passed
the House, passed the Senate Judiciary Committee, and is presently in the
Rules Committee of the Senate awaiting its assignment for a floor vote.
The Legislature is now in recess, and we will return for approximately
two to three weeks following the November election, and I would
anticipate the bill coming up for a floor vote at that time, when we would
expect to secure final passage.
If you would like a copy of the bill, I would suggest you write the
Clerk's Office, Ohio Senate, State House, Columbus, Ohio 43215 and ask
them to forward a copy to you.
Best wishes.
Yours very truly,
[SIGNED]

FRANK H. MAYFIELD, JR.

FHM:pjm
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